EN YEARS from now, when we reflect on the genocide in Darfur, we may well remember Brian Steidle as one of the reasons why we can't say we didn't know what was going on in that ravaged part of Sudan.
Few other Americans have had such an up-close view of the ethnic cleansing in Darfur. And only a handful of other Americans have worked as feverishly to educate their fellow citizens about the region's orgy of violence, which has claimed well over 200,000 lives and forced more than 2 million people (out of a population of about 7 million) from their homes.
Steidle, a former Marine, served as an adviser to African Union monitors in Darfur from September to February. While he was there, the 28-year-old Virginia Tech graduate encountered some of the Sudanese military officers and janjaweed militiamen who are perpetrating crimes against humanity--and he was repulsed by their air of invulnerability despite worldwide media coverage of their atrocities.
Steidle wants to see deployment of a large international force in Darfur that has an explicit mandate to protect civilians and ensure secure routes for humanitarian aid workers. He thinks that force may have to number in the tens of thousands. He also advocates enforcement of a no-fly zone over the region so the Sudanese government can no longer bomb and strafe civilians with helicopter gunships and warplanes.
Steidle has testified on Capitol Hill about Darfur and is working with members of Congress from both parties to craft a strategy for ending the ethnic violence in the western part of Sudan.
The Free Lance-Star's Rick Mercier caught up with Steidle last week in Arlington to discuss what he witnessed in Darfur and what he thinks needs to be done to stop the genocide there.
Here are excerpts from that interview:
Mercier: Could you explain what you were doing in Darfur?
Steidle: We were reporting on violations of the cease-fire [between rebels and Sudanese government forces].
[My job] was basically to assist in report-writing, assist in questioning, anything I could do.
Mercier: We hear about a mandate that limits what AU troops can do. And, of course, in your experiences, you saw abuses occurring but were unable to intervene.
Steidle: Yes. The troops that are there, their mandate, what they are tasked to do, is to protect the monitoring teams, to protect their camps, their helicopters. They're not there to protect villages or IDP [internally displaced persons] camps or even roads so that humanitarian traffic can get through.
Now, we're doing some of that. We are driving a road and telling the NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and the U.N., "We're driving on a road at this time and if you want to follow us, that's fine." So we're providing an escort, without [officially] doing an escort.
There are a number of times we've gone out to a village, put a monitoring team in a village for a week, and brought in about two platoons of soldiers. Basically, they're there to protect the civilians, but that's not their mandate.
When they talk about expanding the mandate, they talk about specifically saying, "Your job is to protect the civilians in the villages and IDP camps, and open the roads for humanitarian traffic and be able to stop any kind of hostile action against the civilian population."
Mercier: Maybe we can talk about the attacks you witnessed.
Steidle: Well, I mean, there were too many to recount all of them. We'd go out and see villages that had been burned, and scores of people had been killed. We conducted interviews with women who'd been gang-raped. We'd see evidence of torture, people who'd had their ears cut off or eyes plucked out before being shot. Men who, after running from their village, if they were caught, were usually castrated and either left to bleed to death or executed. You know, small children who had been shot, people who had been locked in their house and burned alive.
Mercier: You've talked before about an incident where you positioned AU troops at a spot and it had the effect of deterring an attack. It seems important to mention these examples to establish what could be done.
Steidle: Yes, absolutely. After an attack on a village called Labado, a village of 20,000, burnt down--government did it, no doubt about it.
Mercier: When you say the government did it--
Steidle: Meaning I was standing next to the government of Sudan general who was in charge of the troops as the village was being burned to the ground.
Mercier: Was it ground troops, by air, a combination?
Steidle: It was helicopters, it was Antonovs [transport planes reportedly used for bombings], it was government of Sudan forces in vehicles, plus janjaweed [militia forces].
After that village had been attacked and completely burned down, the next village in line--they were on a mission to clear a road to Khartoum--they said they were going to clear it and any resistance to it, they were going to attack.
Well, the next village in line was Muhajeryia. It had twice as many people as Labado and it was an SLA [rebel] stronghold. We knew that there would be hundreds, if not thousands, of people who were going to die. So we knew we had to stop it somehow.
The African Union was able to put 35 armed troops in the village, and their job there was not to protect the civilians, not to protect the town--because that's not their mandate--but to protect the civilian contracting team building a more permanent camp.
And after that, the government troops did not advance. So then the African Union put 70 troops in the village of Labado to protect the monitoring team. Within a week, they were able to negotiate for the government of Sudan to withdraw their thousands of troops from the area, and 3,000 people returned to that village to start to rebuild.
And as of two weeks ago, the State Department told me that 10,000 people had returned.
So that can happen. That example can be repeated all over Darfur.
Mercier: How many troops do you think would be needed?
Steidle: There are many, many numbers. There are a number of very detailed reports that are going to be coming out soon, from a number of working groups. They are very detailed about what is needed. I've always said 25,000 to 50,000. Some people have said 44,000. Some people think it is lower. Some people think it is 10,000. I think that all depends on how the mission is structured, and also whether there's a no-fly zone. If there's a no-fly zone, then obviously you need fewer troops.
But that's what I've always said: 25,000 to 50,000. Now, I don't believe the African Union is capable of mustering that many people.
Mercier: Would that mean a U.N. force would be necessary?
Steidle: Meaning somebody else. I'm not advocating for U.S. or NATO troops to go into Sudan, not by any means. The U.N. would be a good option. Now, the U.N. is stretched thin. They've had other problems in Africa--Congo of late--and they've just agreed to put 10,000 troops in the south [of Sudan], so I don't know if they're capable of mustering this many.
But there needs to be some sort of large troop force to stop the fighting. I think a no-fly zone is a big point, and I think it would cause the government to rethink their actions. And troops on the ground to monitor what is happening, allow the people to return, and also to protect the civilians from the janjaweed that are controlled by the government. I think if those things happen, there can be peace in Darfur.
Mercier: You mentioned the place that was the rebel stronghold. And the Sudanese government says their actions are legitimate counterinsurgency actions, and so if there are areas where there is a rebel presence, is there credibility to the government's claims?
Steidle: They signed a cease-fire in April 2004. Since that time, they have taken back about 75 percent of what the rebels had held before the cease-fire. They use the excuse that there are bandits, that they are policing the area, that they are opening routes. They say they don't know these are rebel territories. That's from the mouth of the general in charge of this operation: "We don't know where the rebels are, we're just clearing the roads. There are bandits."
It's a complete lie. They know where the rebels are. If we know where they are, then they know where they are. They're using it as an excuse to defeat the rebels.
Mercier: We've heard a few things about rebel attacks on humanitarian workers, about rebels not allowing humanitarian workers into certain areas. Do you know what the motivations are for that?
Steidle: I would say in the six months I was there, I saw one of those incidents. And it was done by a bunch of drunk soldiers that were out of control. That unit was completely disbanded. People were reprimanded. I didn't see any other evidence of them restricting humanitarian access. It doesn't make any sense for them do that. The humanitarian groups are providing aid to their people who have been displaced by the government.
Mercier: How much were you able to ascertain about the relationship between the janjaweed and government? Is it right out there in the open?
Steidle: It's clear-cut. It's absolutely clear-cut. They work together. When the government troops need assistance, they call the janjaweed. Sometimes when the janjaweed attack a village, even when there aren't any regular [government] troops on the ground, they call in air support.
I mean, it is clear-cut. It's just two different units. There is the regular government forces and there is the janjaweed, and they fight side by side.
Mercier: So in your mind, is there no question that what's going on is genocide--or do you not get into it?
Steidle: I don't get into it, but there's no question in my mind that it's genocide. Speaking to some janjaweed on the ground, they have told me why they're doing it. They're doing it because these people are a lesser race, they're black Africans, they want to kill them all or drive them out.
Mercier: You've heard this directly from janjaweed?
Steidle: Absolutely.
Mercier: Why would they tell that to you?
Steidle: They tell us they are going to burn and loot and kill people. They say, "We've had camels stolen, and we're going to go in this line; we're going to go to this village, and this village, and this village."
And we say, "Well, what are you going to do?"
They say, "We're tracking our camels. Until we find our camels, we're going to burn these villages down, we're going to kill everybody we can, we're going to rape all the women, we're going steal all their stuff."
And then they do it. They're completely up in your face about it, because they know that there is no teeth to the [AU] mission that is currently there.
They need to put more teeth in the mission. They need to specifically mandate that they are to protect civilians.
Mercier: Diplomatically, what do you think the U.S. can do?
Steidle: There's a lot we can do. Hopefully, we can put pressure on the United Nations to get troops in there and to impose sanctions. I think that one of the most important things that can be done is to put the political aspects aside. Put the debate over the [International Criminal Court] aside. Put the debate over whether it's genocide aside. It doesn't matter what you call it, it doesn't matter where these people are going to be tried right now. It does in the future, for sure. But right now it doesn't. Right now what needs to happen is, the killing needs to stop, the people need to be safe.
Going back to what the U.S. can do, there are a number of other countries that have more influence over Sudan than we do.
Mercier: Such as Arab League countries?
Steidle: Arab League countries, China, Russia, Nigeria. I think we can speak to these governments, I think that we can put pressure on them to act on Sudan.
Mercier: It's been about a year since Darfur made it into the papers here, but not a whole lot has been done since then. Do you think we can allow another year to slip by in which not much is done?
Steidle: I think if another year slips by, there won't be anybody left. I mean, 75 percent of the villages in south Darfur are now gone. It's happening right now as we sit here. It's not stopping. You've got to act soon, or there's not going to be anything left. And we're going to be looking back 10 years from now saying: "Man, that was a genocide. We should have stopped it"--like we're doing now with Rwanda.
RICK MERCIER is a writer and editor for The Free Lance-Star. To learn more about Darfur and about what you can do, go to the International Crisis Group's Web site, crisisweb.org, and the Save Darfur Coalition's Web site, savedarfur.org.