<p> ON WAR Counterinsurgency training

ON WAR Counterinsurgency training

November 2, 2007 12:36 am

A U.S. Marine corporal heads out on patrol in Fallujah, Iraq. The new Counterinsurgency Center at MCB Quantico is intended to provide the best training possible for those who will face irregular warfare.

Akers:

What's the Center of Excellence for Irregular Warfare all about?

Kelly:

Irregular warfare encompasses counterinsurgency, information operations, psychological operations, civil affairs, and numerous other tenets that fall underneath that moniker.

The center was established in May. I reported as director in June, and we are continuing to work the issues that deal with counterinsurgency, stability operations, [etc.]. The center has become a one-stop shop for the Marine Corps as it relates to these things.

We coordinate with all the other services. [For example,] I talk with the Special Forces guys. Then, obviously, we take a look internally at the Marine Corps and say, "OK, here's where we are at, here's where we are going, here's where we need to go."

Akers:

When you are fully operational, how many people will go through the center in a year?

Kelly:

Well, at the center we basically work issues or work on doctrine, organization, some training issues, but we won't be a center that people will come to for formal schooling. We are going to [offer], for example on our Web site, a place where everybody can come and read the current doctrine, the issues being discussed, and the latest briefs [on irregular warfare].

Then we let the smart guys do the work at the training and education commands. [They might say,] "OK, we'll integrate this at boot camp," [or] "Well, we are going to integrate this in the School of Infantry."

Akers:

It wouldn't be too far of a stretch to say that you do what a think tank does?

Kelly:

Yeah, I would say it is a think tank, but again, for the Marine Corps, we are going to [develop] the doctrine; we are going to look at organization, training, facilities, and leadership and provide input into the way the Marine Corps should go [regarding] counterinsurgency.

violent preparation

Akers:

What are your qualifications to run the center?

Kelly:

I was a company commander in Somalia in 1993. I ran my own city, so to speak. Then I worked in Kosovo in 1999, going in with the First Marines and the Army to set up containment areas for the collection of weapons, mass-grave sites, civil affairs.

Then I did two tours in Iraq. I was an operations officer for the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit in what they call the Triangle of Death south of Baghdad. At the operational level, I have worked in joint staffs and within the Marine Expeditionary Force.

Akers:

An interesting thing about growing older is that you see things come back around again. I remember growing up in the '60s. Kennedy was president and he put a large emphasis on counterinsurgency. That's in fact how the U.S. presence in Vietnam started. Did the attention that the military paid to counterinsurgency lapse with changing world conditions?

Kelly:

Yeah, I think a lot of people in the post-Vietnam era just wanted to get rid of Vietnam. [We] basically started looking more at [war with] Russia, then we got back into zipping across the desert, combined arms, those things.

But from the Marine Corps perspective, one of the greatest books on counterinsurgency is "The Small Wars Manual," written in the early '40s, which talks about guerrilla warfare. And, of course, the Marine Corps has a history in irregular warfare.

From my perspective, [events] like World War II and World War I are more the exception than the rule [regarding] major combat operations vs. irregular threats.

So, we have a history in it. [Former Commandant Charles] Krulak talked about the "three-block war." In one block you're taking out the bad guys, in the next block you're feeding the people, and in another block maybe digging them a well or something like that.

Now, I think we have to take a look at the future and say, "If this is going to be a generational [conflict], how do we want to train and educate [troops] now?"

'ungoverned space'

Akers:

Could you articulate a few basic principles of irregular warfare or counterinsurgency?

Kelly:

You are now looking at state and non-state actors vying for influence. In the old, "classic" counterinsurgency, the [enemy's question was] "How do I take control of the state?" Well, you are not necessarily seeing that all the time now, because in certain countries, like Somalia, instability is good for some in the [enemy] organization. They don't necessarily want to take over the government. Groups like the Taliban [thrive in] what we call "ungoverned space." So you have to look at each conflict individually.

Akers:

In all these models, winning the populace's allegiance, or at least taking the allegiance of the populace away from the insurgents, is a key component, isn't it?

Kelly:

It is not necessarily that you are there to win the hearts and minds. You're asking how you can keep them from going to the [bad] guys or keep them neutral. That's when you look at what we will call "direct and indirect" [strategies].

"Direct kinetic" is "I'm going to bomb this house." Or do I do "non-kinetic"? Is there another way to skin this cat, get the bad guys, but at the same time reduce potential casualties? Because the second and third effects could be that I could take this guy out, but I might also increase the people being angry at me.

[So] you've got the bad guys, you didn't destroy the house, and that brings credibility. Once you get credibility, then the people may now either go neutral or they may start [thinking], "It's better for me to support those guys" because they are much more [humane].

In Anbar Province, for example, al-Qaida started telling tribes to arrange marriages and if you didn't like it, they were going to kill you. So al-Qaida ostracized themselves. The Sunni tribes had been supporting them but have now turned on them based on their actions. So we're trying to reinforce [that disaffection] by saying we're here to help.

how long?

Akers:

I had a conversation with Bing West [a former combat Marine in South Vietnam who is covering the Iraq War as a journalist] about a year ago. I brought up counterinsurgency and he downplayed it. He said, "The Sunnis have been dispossessed. They have been kicked out of power, and they are never going to love us."

So he thought we are looking at a long-term occupation. He compared Iraq to the South after the Civil War, when Yankee troops were here for a long time. But the counterinsurgency model of war fighting is the model right now under Gen. David Petraeus. So what's your reaction to what West said?

Kelly:

Every area is different. Baghdad is different from the southern portion of the country. So if you're having success, you can reduce your footprint.

I think we will [maintain] some type of capability there. Like General Petraeus in his brief talk about it, we have a strategic reaction force, an operational reaction force, and a tactical reaction force. We have always had training in Kuwait since the Gulf War. We have bases still in Germany, just like there are bases in Okinawa. Some type of relationship is going to be maintained, I think.

Solutions may be much different in one spot than another. [Groups of] Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds have different [agendas]. Some want electricity; some are in the farming areas, so they are more worried about irrigation. We always have to ask, "What are the things these people need?" It gives us credibility to get these people on their feet and support their life as it should be.

Akers:

War is a stressful. Are there stresses peculiar to troops doing counterinsurgency?

Kelly:

Every day is stressful once you go across the wire. You are already on your toes because you may get hit by an IED, you may get ambushed. Complacency kills.

We have low-intensity conflict, mid-intensity conflict, and high-intensity conflict. At any moment, it can all of a sudden become very high-intensity for a particular kid, even though the conflict may be a single shot.