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An Army flight medic directs Marines as they carry an Afghan gunshot victim to a waiting helicopter during a medevac operation in the Helmand province of Afghanistan recently. |
AMERICA TODAY is a super-
Take Iran's nuclear program. Let's not hype the threat--doesn't every discussion about Iran uncritically assume grave danger to the U.S., and then start ratcheting upward?
Americans think of Iran and picture Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. Ahmedinejad's lies about the Holocaust and repeated threats to Israel are bluster from a man with limited powers and waning authority. His rants cheer a beleaguered political base that no doubt loves to watch him yank Uncle Sam's beard. But is this the type of aggression upon which our Iran policy should be based?
Unquestionably, Iran is responsible for terrorist acts, often in association with regional allies. However, it does not threaten U.S. soil or advance a fanatical global agenda like al-Qaida. Its actions stem from well-trod regional conflicts and grievances, and have been similarly circumscribed. This is not a political regime that we like, but it is a predictable one, with local ambitions.
Indeed, Iran's nuclear program fits conventional understandings of how insecure states act. The country has been invaded or occupied three times in the last century. Its neighbors Russia, India, and Pakistan are feuding and frighteningly nuclearized. U.S. forces now surround Iran from the Gulf waters through Iraq, Turkey, Central Asia, and Afghanistan. The American president who declared Iran "evil" in 2002--before Ahmedinejad was even mayor of Tehran--attacked its non-nuclear "evil" neighbor Iraq (which invaded Iran in 1980).
DESIRE FOR NUKES
Patriotic Iranians therefore need not be wild-eyed Holocaust-deniers to feel insecure. It would be irrational not to want nukes. Both Ahmedinejad's allies and democratic critics have lauded the nuclear program, which symbolizes national security, sovereignty, and pride more than the political fortunes of one bombastic thug. A determined country with know-how and resources probably cannot be denied a nuclear weapon. Even skin-and-bone North Korea has the bomb.
More threats thus won't disentangle the desire for nuclear weapons from normal Iranian patriotism. But persuasion might, including guarantees of the type that removed nuclear missiles from Cuba in 1962--i.e., assurances that the U.S. will not invade. The real trick, now as then, is to defuse the situation with policies that allow all sides to save face. Recent (albeit tentative) progress in talks over inspections and Iran's nuclear materials suggest that the West's "softer" diplomatic approach is useful, as do new polls indicating lessening support for nuclear weapons among Iranian liberals.
The stakes in Afghanistan, on the other hand, could hardly be more chilling. The long, tiring war against the Taliban and its ilk is no bigoted and endless "clash of civilizations." It is a clash
Indeed, as support for the war slips, let's pause to remember who the Taliban and al-Qaida really are. Purporting to act for Islam, they seek to create women who are immobile, ignorant, and incapable of independent thought. Since their women aren't born that way, they must make them so, killing them if they resist (as they frequently did when in power). The Taliban and al-Qaida image of the ideal woman--of half of humanity--is a mentally disabled, physically confined reproductive machine. And they have aided or inspired mass murder worldwide. This fight is the real deal.
PACK UP AND HEAD HOME?
Some now say that "realistic" national interest requires we leave Afghanistan. Our troops and resources are overburdened, and the country's core problems seem unfixable, especially after the dismal August elections. Thus, the best we can do is to start packing up as we parley with local moderates, pressure regional allies, and hope to find al-Qaida eggs before they hatch.
Others push Obama to raise troop and investment levels in Afghanistan even beyond what he seems willing to consider. This includes prominent supporters of the Iraq war, who argue there can be "no middle course" between pullout and full engagement.
Neither pole in this debate should win. While a drawdown will save U.S. lives and resources in the near term, Afghanistan is too dangerous to leave untended, imperious as that sounds. Pakistani expert Ahmed Rashid warns that, to be safe, the U.S. must commit to assembling a minimal state able to keep the Taliban and al-Qaida at bay. And just as we cannot hope to stay on top of enemies by leaving, so must we reject old schemes of Afghan renewal. Prudence argues that Afghans need a no-frills, working state much more than a teetering democracy.
Indeed, that seems just where we're headed: a "just right" containment strategy that seeks a modicum of stability while keeping boots on the ground and one eye on neighboring Pakistan. The only clear goal will be to ensure enemies stay on the defensive until the threat passes. The Goldilocks strategy thus begets its own uncertainties, but reminders of the enemy's true nature may prod a restive American public to see its virtues.
Afghanistan, too, has been a "war of choice." Unlike in Vietnam, today's military is voluntary. It should not be deployed frivolously. But can there be a more justified use for a voluntary military than keeping monsters like the Taliban and al-Qaida in a box?
Goldilocks lived to tell the tale. Pandora did not.
Ranjit Singh teaches political science and international affairs at the University of Mary Washington. He served as a foreign observer at the August 2009 presidential and provincial elections in Afghanistan. |